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A partial defense of the giant squid
�
Sanjiv Jaggia, Professor of Economics and Finance, California Polytechnic State University 
Satish Thosar, Professor of Finance, University of Redlands 
For those who have been meditating at a Buddhist monastery over 
the last year, the giant squid in the title refers to Goldman Sachs 
Inc. Matt Taibbi writing in Rolling Stone magazine1 characterizes 
the investment bank as: “a great vampire squid wrapped around 
the face of humanity, relentlessly jamming its blood funnel into 
anything that smells like money.” The article is (to put it mildly) 
a colorful polemic hurled at Goldman Sachs accusing it of essen-
tially creating and profiting from various financial bubbles since the 
onset of the Great Depression. 
Taibbi’s rhetoric was not well received in the mainstream business 
press. Reactions were dismissive (along the lines of: simplistic analy-
sis; he’s not a real business reporter!), indignant (basically objecting 
to the article’s over-the-top language), defensive (all of them do it, 
why pick on Goldman?) but seemed not to engage with the substance 
of Taibbi’s accusations. In fact, an ‘audit’ done by the Columbia 
Journalism Review’s Dean Sparkman largely validates Taibbi’s sub-
stantive claims2. 
One of these claims relates to the tech sector bubble of the late 
1990s. With the benefit of hindsight, it is clear that many of the 
high-tech IPOs launched in this period were based on dubious 
valuations. Goldman was certainly active in IPO underwriting and 
had the highest ranking in terms of underwriter reputation [Carter 
et al. (1998)]3. The firm also had its share of high-profile misfires 
(for example: Webvan, Etoys) when the dot.com mania peaked and 
crashed in the spring of 2000. Goldman was also arguably involved 
in activities such as spinning and laddering4; the latter has the 
effect of artificially pumping up the stock prices of IPO firms in the 
aftermarket. But was Goldman a particularly egregious offender in 
a climate in which underwriting best practices had slipped precipi-
tously?5 And how should this be evaluated? 
As it turns out, we were involved in researching high-tech firms 
that had an IPO in the late 1990s. We found significant positive 
momentum and sharp reversals within a six-month aftermarket 
window6. When we were doing the study, underwriter reputation 
was not a central concern — it was only one of several control vari-
ables we employed. However, in the wake of the Taibbi article and 
the considerable controversy it has generated, we thought it would 
be interesting to revisit our sample to see if we could uncover any 
interesting facts related to underwriter identity. 
The set up 
Our primary sample was drawn from ipo.com, which lists the 
universe of U.S. IPOs with dates, offer prices etc. classified in a 
number of categories. We chose all IPOs from January 1, 1998 
1	� Taibbi, M., 2009, “The great American bubble machine,” Rolling Stone magazine, 
issue 1082-83, July 2. 
2	� See: Don’t dismiss Taibbi: what the mainstream press can learn from a Goldman take-
down, The Audit, posted on the CJR website on August 08, 2009. 
3	� Based on the ranking system developed in: Carter, R. B., F. H. Dark, and A. K. Singh, 
1998, “Underwriter reputation, initial returns and the long-run performance of IPO 
10 stocks,” Journal of Finance, 53:1, 285-311. 
4 Spinning involves the underwriter allocating underpriced IPOs to favored executives 
– the quid pro quo being a promise of future business. Laddering involves allocations 
conditioned upon buyers agreeing to purchase additional shares of the IPO in the after-
through October 30, 1999 in the following sectors: biotechnol-
ogy, computer hardware, computer software, electronics, Internet 
services, Internet software, and telecommunications. This resulted 
in a sample of 301 high-tech IPO firms. We stopped at October 30, 
1999 because we wanted to study medium-term aftermarket price 
behavior beyond the IPO date while excluding the market correc-
tion that commenced in 2000 [Jaggia and Thosar (2004)]. 
In Figure 1, we provide selected descriptive statistics relating to our 
sample broken down by three lead underwriter reputation tiers: 
top, medium, and bottom. The top-tier underwriters are those that 
received the highest score of 9 in the Carter et al. (1998) rank-
ing system. These are: Goldman Sachs, Credit Suisse First Boston 
(renamed Credit Suisse), Hambrecht & Quist, and Salomon Smith 
Barney. The medium-tier underwriters are those with a score 
between 8.75 and 8.99, while the bottom tier includes all firms with 
a score below 8.75. 
There do not appear to be any obvious differences between IPO 
firms represented by top-tier underwriters and the others in terms 
of objective quality criteria. If anything, metrics such as: the level 
of initial underpricing, percentage of profitable firms, and firm age 
Notes: 
1. Standard deviations are in parentheses below the sample means. 
2. Top-tier underwriter firms are those assigned the highest point score of 9 in the 
Carter et al. (1998) system. This category includes Goldman Sachs. Medium-tier 
firms are those with a score of 8.75 – 8.99. Bottom-tier are all those below 8.75. 
3. A green-shoe provision gives the underwriter the option to purchase additional 
shares at the offer price to cover over allotments. Presence of the provision 
indirectly increases underwriter compensation. 
Figure 1 – Selected descriptive statistics for IPO firms classified by underwriter 
reputation 
Underwriter reputation 
Variables Top-tier Medium-tier Bottom-tier 
Cumulative market-adjusted return 
(CMAR) at the end of six months 
44.71 
(140.91) 
19.95 
(101.88) 
-16.55 
(57.23) 
Percentage change from offer to 
market open price 
65.74 
(72.26) 
68.38 
(105.15) 
43.66 
(73.18) 
Percentage of firms with positive net 
income in pre-IPO year 
21.11 
(41.04) 
16.90 
(37.61) 
24.64 
(43.41) 
Revenue in pre-IPO year ($ millions) 83.71 
(285.64) 
50.71 
(200.94) 
75.84 
(397.87) 
Offer size ($ millions) 134.48 
(176.86) 
126.97 
(490.20) 
48.60 
(47.48) 
Percentage of firms with green-shoe 
(over-allotment) option 
64.44 
(48.14) 
54.23 
(50.00) 
55.07 
(50.11) 
Percentage of firms belonging to 
the Internet services or software 
categories 
61.11 
(49.02) 
60.56 
(49.04) 
59.42 
(49.46) 
Firm age at IPO date (years) 4.45 
(3.40) 
5.61 
(5.88) 
5.90 
(6.03) 
Number 90 142 69 
market. The SEC sanctioned various underwriting firms including Goldman Sachs, which 
paid a fine of U.S.$40 million without admitting wrongdoing. The firm also reportedly 
paid U.S.$110 million to settle an investigation by New York state regulators. 
5	� Taibbi quotes Professor Jay Ritter, a leading IPO researcher at the University of 
Florida: “In the early eighties, the major underwriters insisted on three years of 
profitability. Then it was one year, then it was a quarter. By the time of the Internet 
bubble, they were not even requiring profitability in the foreseeable future.” 
6	� See: Jaggia, S., and S. Thosar, 2004, “The medium-term aftermarket in high-tech 
IPOs: patterns and implications,” Journal of Banking and Finance, 28, 931-950. 
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Note: Top-tier underwriter firms are those assigned the highest point score of 9 in 
the Carter et al. (1998) system. In our sample, they represent 90 firms. Medium-tier 
are those with a score of 8.75 – 8.99 representing 142 firms. 
Bottom-tier are all those below 8.75 representing 69 firms. 
Figure 2 – Cumulative market-adjusted returns (CMAR) for IPO firms grouped by lead 
underwriter reputation 
seem to favor the bottom-tier group. The average IPO offer size is 
considerably larger for the top-tier compared to the bottom-tier 
group, which is not surprising. One expects that superior reputation 
carries with it the ability to tap more extensive investor networks 
to raise larger chunks of capital at a given time. Also worth noting 
is that the top-tier group has the highest proportion of contracts 
with a green-shoe option. A green-shoe provision gives the under-
writer the option to purchase additional shares at the offer price to 
cover over-allotments and thereby indirectly increases underwriter 
compensation. 
A striking and somewhat surprising difference is in the cumula-
tive market-adjusted returns (CMAR) registered by each group. 
To study this in greater detail, we graph (Figure 2) the CMAR for 
each group using the post-IPO day 1 open price as the base through 
trading-day 125 or approximately six months after the IPO date7. 
There are visual and arguably economically significant differences 
across groups. The bottom-tier group (green) immediately slips into 
negative territory and stays there for a six-month CMAR of -16.5 
percent. The medium (red) and top (blue) groups display strong 
positive momentum and reach a CMAR peak of 40.5 percent (at 
day 114) and 61.5 percent (at day 112) respectively. The CMAR then 
tapers off possibly due to the onset of lock-up expiration pressures 
and at the end of six months ends up at 20.0 percent and 44.7 per-
cent for the medium and top groups respectively. 
This can be viewed in a number of ways. If the market is behav-
ing rationally and recognizing ‘true value’ as time elapses, the 
45 percent CMAR displayed by the top group represents serious 
underestimation of the initial IPO offer prices. It represents in 
7	� Let Pi1 represent the day 1 open price of the ith firm and let Pm1 be the corresponding 
level of the market (Nasdaq) index. Similarly, Pit and Pmt represent the open price at 
day t of the ith firm and the market respectively. The CMAR of the firm at time t is 
calculated as: CMARit = [Pit/Pi1] ÷ [Pmt/Pm1] -1. The time in question does not refer to 
calendar time, but to the time from the IPO date. 
effect a wealth transfer from the founders and seed financiers of 
the firm to outside investors and this is over and above the initial 
underpricing of 66 percent for this group (Figure 1). Under normal 
circumstances, the underwriters could be justly accused either of 
incompetence in terms of valuation or extorting their IPO clients to 
enrich themselves and their favored customers. 
On the other hand, if informed investors recognize that tech sector 
stock prices are inflated, unsustainable, and are in the market to 
exploit the ‘greater fool,’ the CMAR patterns may reflect the ability 
of certain underwriters through their analyst coverage, laddering 
arrangements, etc., to not only stabilize but pump up prices in the 
aftermarket until the wealth transfer from uninformed to informed 
investors is duly complete. 
We decided that a closer disaggregated look at the top-tier group 
might be useful. 
The defense 
In Figures 3 and 4, we report descriptive statistics and CMAR pat-
terns for the IPOs underwritten by top-tier firms. Hambrecht & 
Quist and Salomon Smith Barney are combined so as to represent 
a reasonable sample size; Credit Suisse and Goldman Sachs are 
reported separately. 
A few metrics are worth noting. More firms represented by Goldman 
(27 percent) were profitable in their pre-IPO year than Credit Suisse 
Variables CS GS Rest 
Cumulative market-adjusted return 80.09 27.51 30.55
�
(CMAR) at the end of six months
� (165.39) (131.84) (121.06)
�
Percentage change from offer to 
 74.34 85.67 26.63
�
market open price
� (75.17) (81.23) (28.61)
�
Percentage of firms with positive net 
 14.29 27.03 20.00
�
income in pre-IPO year
� (35.64) (45.02) (40.83)
�
Revenue in pre-IPO year ($ millions)
� 41.34 37.32 199.81 
(147.31) (50.56) (504.84)
�
Offer size ($ millions)
� 101.97 155.59 139.63 
(103.99) (222.89) (165.43)
�
Percentage of firms with green-shoe 
 67.86 86.47 28.00
�
(over-allotment) option
� (47.56) (34.66) (45.83)
�
Percentage of firms belonging to 
 71.43 59.46 52.00
�
the Internet services or software 
 (46.00) (49.77) (50.99) 
categories
�
Firm age at IPO date (years)
� 4.01 5.03 4.07 
(2.13) (3.98) (3.63)
�
Number
� 28 37 25
�
Notes:
�
1.	� Standard deviations are in parentheses below the sample means. 
2.	�Top-tier underwriter firms are those assigned the highest point score of 9 in 

the Carter et al. (1998) system; CS = Credit Suisse, GS = Goldman Sachs, Rest = 

Hambrecht & Quist and Salomon Smith Barney 

3.	�A green-shoe provision gives the underwriter the option to purchase additional 

shares at the offer price to cover over allotments. Presence of the provision 

indirectly increases underwriter compensation.
�
Figure 3 – Selected descriptive statistics for IPO firms classified by top-tier 

underwriters
�
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Note: CS = Credit Suisse representing 28 firms; GS = Goldman Sachs representing 37 
firms; Rest = Hambrecht & Quist and Salomon Smith Barney together representing 
25 firms. 
Figure 4 – Cumulative market-adjusted returns (CMAR) for IPO firms grouped by top-
tier underwriters 
(14 percent) and the rest (20 percent). Goldman firms were also 
marginally longer in business before the IPO date. On the other 
hand, Goldman firms were subject to greater initial underpricing on 
average. They also had a higher average offer size and were more 
likely to be subject to a green-shoe provision8. But the most sug-
gestive statistic in our view is the six-month CMAR. The Goldman 
group’s CMAR at 28 percent is significantly lower than that of the 
Credit Suisse group which racked up 80 percent. Thus aftermarket 
momentum (or manipulation if one were to take the cynical view) is 
lowest for firms represented by Goldman. 
This is borne out by the CMAR patterns in Figure 4. The red line 
representing Goldman firms is virtually flat in the immediate after-
market, when most purported price pumping takes place. The blue 
(Credit Suisse) and green (Hambrecht & Quist and Salomon Smith 
Barney) lines suggest higher levels of momentum and reversal 
within a six-month period — more of a bubble within a bubble pat-
tern with the benefit of hindsight. 
After all is said and done, the tech bubble is only one instance of a 
series of such events in recorded history. And, while these events 
result in a lot of wealth destruction, the firms left standing in the 
end usually signify technological and productivity gains to society, 
which may in the long-run exceed the Schumpeterian costs. 
We do not profess to know how to execute such a cost-benefit analy-
sis. Instead, we decided to undertake an outlier analysis within our 
sample. We carried out a case study-type analysis of the 20 firms 
that registered a six-month CMAR of more than 100 percent and 
were represented by top-tier lead underwriters. We were essentially 
projecting ourselves back in time before the crash and picking a small 
IPo firm name/current or former CMAR % lead underwriter Status 
ticker symbol 
Infospace Inc (INSP) 199.2 Hambrecht & Quist B 
Art Technology Group (ARTG) 255.4 Hambrecht & Quist B 
F5 Networks Inc (FFIV) 469.9 Hambrecht & Quist A 
Inktomi Corp (INKT) 142.7 Goldman Sachs C 
Ebay Inc (EBAY) 623.4 Goldman Sachs A 
Viant Corp (VIAN) 183.6 Goldman Sachs D 
Active Software Inc (ASWX) 248 Goldman Sachs C 
Allscripts Inc (MDRX) 103.9 Goldman Sachs A 
Tibco Software (TIBX) 182.8 Goldman Sachs B 
Inet Technologies (INTI) 119 Goldman Sachs C 
Juniper Network Inc (JNPR) 116.5 Goldman Sachs A 
NetIQ Corp (NTIQ) 141.9 Credit Suisse C 
Appnet Systems Inc (APNT) 158.4 Credit Suisse C 
Commerce One Inc (CMRC) 609.8 Credit Suisse C 
E.Piphany Inc (EPNY) 138.3 Credit Suisse C 
Phone.com Inc (PHCM) 141.4 Credit Suisse C 
Software.com Inc (SWCM) 237.3 Credit Suisse C 
Tumbleweed Software Corp (TMWD) 201.7 Credit Suisse C 
Liberate Technologies (LBRT) 487.2 Credit Suisse C 
Vitria Technology (VITR) 250 Credit Suisse C 
Notes: 
1.	� The above firms were represented by top-tier lead underwriters and experienced 
post-IPO six-month cumulative market-adjusted returns (CMAR) greater than 100 
percent. 
2. Status (August 2009) definitions are given below: 
3.	�Successful ongoing enterprises; significant positive returns realized by early long-
term investors. 
4. Viable ongoing enterprises. 
5.	�Merged, restructured or otherwise consolidated; significant impairment to early 
valuations. 
6. Defunct. 
Figure 5 – Current status of selected IPO firms launched during the dotcom bubble era 
subset of the likeliest candidates for success. How did they perform 
over the long-term? We traced the fortunes of these 20 firms from 
their IPO date up until the present (August 2009). We examined 
available financials, stock price performance, mergers, consolida-
tions etc. Several firms were targets of class-action lawsuits filed by 
aggrieved stockholders claiming misstatements in the IPO prospec-
tus and the like. Our findings are summarized in Figure 5, which is 
essentially a status report on each firm. We assigned each firm into 
one of following categories, or letter grades if you will. 
A These are all firms that have survived and thrived. In our judg-
ment, they all have successful business models and good pros-
pects going forward. An investor who bought shares soon after 
the IPO date and held on to them till August 2009 would have 
realized significant positive returns. Only four of the 20 firms 
receive an A grade — three of these (Ebay, Juniper Network, 
Allscripts) were lead underwritten by Goldman Sachs. The fourth 
(F5 Networks) was underwritten by Hambrecht & Quist. 
B	�The three firms in this category are viewed as viable ongoing 
enterprises. There is a fair amount of within-group variation. For 
8	� This may reflect Goldman’s greater clout even within the top-tier group. 
12 – The journal of financial transformation 
  
 
 
instance, Infospace (Hambrecht & Quist) has negative income 
in its latest financial year but still has a market capitalization of 
U.S.$293 million. Early post-IPO investors who held on to their 
position would see a negative return. In contrast, Tibco Software 
(Goldman) is profitable, has a current market capitalization of 
U.S.$1.61 billion, and a P/E multiple of 27. The only reason Tibco 
did not get an A grade is that early buy-and-hold investors would 
register a negative stock return. 
C	�The twelve firms in this group were severely impacted in the 
tech sector crash of 2000. While a small number survive with 
their original stock ticker symbol, none of these are profitable or 
actively traded. Most have merged, restructured, or otherwise 
consolidated. The common element is that early investors who 
had not divested before the crash would have suffered signifi-
cant (if not quite total) losses. Goldman represented three firms 
in this group. 
D The one firm in this category (Viant; Goldman) declared bank-
ruptcy in 2003 and is essentially defunct. 
Hambrecht & Quist represented only three firms (1 A; 2 Bs), all of 
which survive and in aggregate delivered considerable value to 
early investors. Goldman’s record is mixed with three As and a B 
balanced out with three Cs and a D. Credit Suisse has the poorest 
record in terms of our sample (9 Cs). None of the firms they rep-
resented were successful in weathering the tech sector shakeout. 
Thus, even among the small subset of IPO firms represented by 
top-tier underwriters and greeted with sustained enthusiasm by 
investors, ex-post analysis reveals considerable variation in the 
staying power of their business models. 
Conclusion 
A respected market observer recently commented: “When faced 
with market euphoria, whatever its source, financial institutions 
will always be confronted with the same stark choice: lower your 
standards or lower your market share.”9 
Goldman was certainly part of the general deterioration of under-
writing standards but our analysis reveals that they did represent 
some very good firms and in terms of our CMAR analysis were a 
reasonably responsible player in the IPO aftermarket. Perhaps their 
quality control mechanisms were not quite so compromised. More 
recently, they seem to have recognized the risks stemming from 
subprime lending well ahead of their competitors, hedged with 
some success, and have emerged from the financial crisis more or 
less intact10. We doubt that Taibbi would set much store by this but 
there it is. 
9	� Jonathan A. Knee, senior managing director at Evercore Partners, in the New York 
Times, DealBook Dialogue, October 6, 2009. 
10 Critics may point out that Goldman would likely have gone under (or at least taken 
large losses) if the U.S. taxpayer had not bailed out AIG and thereby its counterpar-
ties. 
13 
